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Abstract 
This paper aims to give a face to the ‘globalization paradigm’ at work in some global histories and to 
recognize similarities between this meta-narrative coordination of space and time, and older meta-
narratives of the world. Narrating the space and time of the world in order to understand and represent 
its coherent meaning is not a new phenomenon. This paper looks to medieval history to show that 
despite claims that the history of globalization is unique to modernity, the meta-narrative is familiar to 
narrations of the space and time of the world produced in the Middle Ages, before the supposed advent 
of globalization. The aim is to challenge the assumption that the globalization paradigm is a modern 
phenomenon, since this assumption conceals links to old historiographies and epistemologies. It 
suggests that medieval history can offer a critical reflection on existing global histories as well as 
opening up new directions for the future of the field. In addition to questioning the ‘modernity’ of the 
globalization paradigm medieval history acts as a reminder of the historically constructed nature of 
global concepts and the need to think about the ‘globe’ as a diversely narrated and constructed subject 
rather than a singular-empirical object. The paper looks to the European Middle Ages to reflect on the 
politics of conceptualisations and historicisations of the ‘globe’, and to show that pluralities are not 
only produced beyond Europe but within it, and this is a tactical-historiographical move to break away 
from the contours of pre-existing critiques from the fields of postcolonial and Latin American studies.  
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 1 
Introduction 
Lynn Hunt recently observed that the historiographical turn of global history has been characterised by 
what she termed the ‘globalization paradigm’. While not all global histories operate within this 
globalization paradigm,
1
 its scope and implications are significant enough to warrant further 
historiographical analysis. Hunt contended that the ‘globalization paradigm’ stepped into the vacuum 
created by the collapse of earlier paradigms, and the deconstructions, or limitations, of earlier social 
and cultural theories, such as Marxism, modernization, the Annales school, and identity politics. Hunt 
followed this with the warning question: ‘is globalization a new paradigm for historical explanation 
that replaces those criticized by cultural theories? Or is it a Trojan horse that threatens to bring back 
old paradigms rather than offering a truly new one?’2 Protagonists of the globalization paradigm have 
interpreted globalization as an exclusively modern affair, and yet if we look at the histories of the 
world produced in Europe in the Middle Ages we find many similarities.
3
 This article addresses the 
question recently raised by Hunt from the perspective of the European Middle Ages. The perspective 
of [the European] medieval history has three functions in this paper. Firstly it explores the connections 
between the globalization paradigm and the meta-narratives of the world produced in the Middle 
Ages; this challenges the temporal politics at work in the globalization paradigm, which rests on an 
assumption of a divide between the Middle Ages and ‘modernity’.4 Secondly it has an epistemological 
function, offering insight into the constructed nature of global concepts. Thirdly it has a 
historiographical function, in opposition to the postcolonial and Latin Americanist assumptions that 
alternative narratives and critical approaches can only be devised outside Europe, it looks at the 
pluralities produced within Europe as a way to escape old historiographical problems. This follows the 
work of Kathleen Davis, who looked to the Middle Ages to challenge the problematic politics of 
periodization and ideology of ‘modernity’; as Davis explained, this approach is important since ‘the 
boldest, most celebrated critiques of rigid historical paradigms usually reinforce rather than disrupt 
this periodization’.5 The first part of the paper identifies the globalization paradigm at work in some 
global histories and indicates the way in which the paradigm suffers from a problematic paradox in the 
form of the reproduction of universal history. The second part of the paper uses medieval history to 
demonstrate the similarity between the globalization paradigm and older narrations of the world. 
Finally, it does not just use the Middle Ages to disrupt the periodization at work in the globalization 
paradigm but uses medieval history to contextualise the multitudinous and complex attempts to 
understand and represent the coherence of the space and time of the world. 
 
The globalization paradigm 
Historiographical summaries of global history have often explained models but pointed no fingers; this 
paper’s title, ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes’, comes from this sense that that global history is seen but 
                                                     
1
 See the discussions in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori eds, Global Intellectual History (New York, Columbia University 
Press, 2013). 
2
 Lynn Hunt, Writing History in the Global Era (New York: Norton &Company Inc., 2014), 52. 
3
 For the purposes of this paper the terms ‘Middle Ages’ and ‘medieval history’ are understood as European categories.  
4
 The problematic notion of ‘modernity’ is understood here as an ideological construct that has been entangled with the 
history of colonialism. This has been discussed by Walter Mignolo, most of all in The Darker Side of Western Modernity: 
Global Futures, decolonial options (Michigan, 2011), Enrique Dussel, ‘Eurocentrism and Modernity’, Boundary 2, Vol. 
20, No. 3 (1993), pp. 65-76, and Aníbal Quijano, ‘Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality’, Cultural Studies, Vol. 21, Nos 
2–3 (2007). The work of Mignolo, Quijano, and Dussel has been very important, but these authors themselves construct a 
notion of ‘Eurocentric modernity’ which has long been debated by historians both inside and outside Europe. Rather than 
reproducing these debates, this article follows the approach of Kathleen Davis, who looks to the Middle Ages to 
challenge the politics of periodization. See Kathleen Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty, How Ideas of Feudalism & 
Secularization Govern the Politics of Time (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
5
 Kathleen Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty, How Ideas of Feudalism & Secularization Govern the Politics of Time, 2. 
Here Davis gives the example of Johannes Fabian’s Time and the Other. 
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not seen, everywhere but nowhere, understood but unknown. Lynn Hunt recently gave this 
historiographical turn a name, ‘the globalization paradigm’. But what is this?  
From Lynn Hunt we get the sense that the globalization paradigm is the product of ‘writing 
history in a global era’. There have been different attempts to define this global era. Doreen Massey 
described this ‘global era’ as characterised by ‘a speeding up, and spreading out’ and a ‘time-space’ 
compression’.6 Adam McKeown defined it as the era of globalization.7 Matthias Middell and Katja 
Naumann also contended that global history should aim to understand the uniquely modern 
phenomenon of globalization.
8
 While the history of globalization may only be a slice of the sprawling 
and unruly field of global history, global histories are often explicitly or implicitly influenced by the 
globalization paradigm, which often dominates contemporary discourses on society, economy, and 
culture as well as history. Approaching the question slightly differently, the French sociologist Alain 
Touraine set out to define ‘a new paradigm for understanding today’s world’ and noted that ‘if the 
theme of globalization has assumed central political importance, it is for a reason that is not so much 
economic as ideological’.9 Since the globalization paradigm is not neutral one must be able to 
recognize it, be conscious of its influences, and sensitive to the ways we use or represent it as 
historians.  
These commentators give a sense that the globalization paradigm is a new explanatory 
framework and is particular to modernity. David Harvey described the accelerated compression of 
time and space as something experienced in the last decades.
10
 Doreen Massey, another geographer, 
also sees the perception of accelerated time-space compression as something recent. The sociologist 
Manuel Castell describes the new global era as a world of global flows.
11
 The historian Bruce Mazlish 
defined the ‘New Global History’ as the history of globalization.12 For Mazlish this new global 
history, the history of globalization, was uniquely ‘modern’ and was characterised by the compression 
of time and space, which was the consequence of an increasingly networked space, the product of the 
invention of the ‘telegraph, the laying of cables, the introduction of the telephone, and then of radio’.13 
In Noel Cowen’s summary this description of the way in which European technologies have driven 
global history leads to the re-invention of a ‘rise of the west narrative’; Cowen wrote that ‘developing 
superior technologies, the Europeans responded longer and more successfully to the global impulse’.14 
The problem of this perspective has already been noted by James Blaut, who has critiqued theories 
that emphasise Europe’s unique contribution to global history and theories of Eurocentric 
diffusionism.
15
 There is an obvious danger in attaching global history to the problematic concept of 
‘modernity’, and in the risk of perpetuating the ideology of Eurocentric modernity.16 Here historians 
can help since if we think of the globalization paradigm as a historical meta-narrative, its uniqueness 
and particularity to ‘modernity’ begins to fragment.  
                                                     
6
 Doreen Massey, ‘A Global Sense of Place’, in From Space, Place and Gender (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1994), 146-156. The notion of ‘time-space’ compression was first discussed by David Harvey in The Condition of 
Postmodernity (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1989). 
7
 Adam McKeon, ‘Periodizing Globalization’, in History Workshop Journal, 63 (2007), 218-230, 219. 
8
 Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, ‘Global history and the spatial turn: from the impact of area studies to the study of 
critical junctures of globalization’, Journal of Global History, 5, 1 (2010), 149-170, 153. 
9
 Alain Touraine, a new paradigm for understanding today’s world (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 21. 
10
 David Harvey, ‘Time-space compression and the postmodern condition’, in Malcolm Water ed., Modernity: After 
Modernity (London: Routledge, 1999), 98-118, 98. 
11
 Manuel Castell’s The rise of the network society (2nd edn, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 3. 
12
 See Bruce Mazlish, The new global history (London: Routledge, 2006). 
13
 Bruce Mazlish, “Comparing Global History to World History”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 26, 3 (1998), 385-
395, 391. 
14
 Noel Cowen, Global History: A Short Overview (Malden, MA: Polity, 2001), 135.  
15
 See James M. Blaut, The Colonizer’s Model of the World, Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History (New 
York: The Guilford Press, 1993). 
16
 Walter Mignolo and other Latin American scholars have written extensively on this.   
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The meta-narrative of the globalization paradigm has a number of identifiable tropes: the 
acceleration of time, the compression of time and space, the prevalence of spatial metaphors 
(everywhere is networked),
17
 a directional narrative,
18
 and a universal claim, which is linked to the 
assumption that there is a singular and commonly understood object of the ‘globe’ at the foundation. 
The directional narrative of the globalization paradigm can be seen as a teleology as the space and 
time of the world moves towards becoming increasingly global. This meta-narrative is most visible in 
the strands of global history that see themselves as the history of globalization, a narrative which is 
often deeply entangled with capitalization. 
The chronology of the global histories that narrate the history of globalization often intersect 
the chronology of capitalization. Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson argued that globalization 
should be understood as the integration of international commodity markets which is evidenced by the 
convergence of commodity prices, which can only be found in the nineteenth century.
19
 For O’Rouke 
and Williamson the globalization that took place in the 1820s marks the transition from world 
histories, produced by the likes of William H. McNeil,
20
 to global history.
21
 O’Rouke and Williamson 
searched for the origins of globalization by looking for the point at which it started ‘influencing 
overall living standards and income distribution, by changing domestic commodity prices within 
national economies’.22 They argue that globalization is defined by market integration, affects the 
whole world, and is exclusively modern (post 1820s), and that the history of this phenomenon, global 
history, is therefore different from the world histories of McNeil, Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre 
Gunder Frank.
23
 But was this really a shift in historiographic genre, perspective, or paradigm? It seems 
to betray signs of universal history in its claims to construct a narrative that is applicable to the whole 
world. Some historians have challenged O’Rouke and Williamson’s chronology but they have not 
challenged the meta-narrative of the globalization paradigm.
24
 For example, some early modern 
historians have considered the establishment of transpacific trade in 1571 which made the economy 
truly ‘global’,25 while other early modernists have supported that argument that globalization did not 
occur until later.
26
 In all these examples practitioners refer to empirical data to convey the impression 
that they are scientifically constructing objective knowledge of the globe. 
Three factors push these global histories which represent the globalization paradigm into the 
territory of universal history. Firstly they claim to represent the whole world and the history of 
humankind, which leads them to dismiss any possibility of global history before the transatlantic or 
transpacific crossings, and to look to large scale integration for evidence. Secondly they follow a 
meta-narrative structure (above I identified the tropes as the acceleration of time, the compression of 
time and space, the prevalence of spatial metaphors, a teleological direction, and a universal claim).
27
 
                                                     
17
 For example, Manuel Castell, The rise of the network society. 
18
 For example, meta-narratives of global economics which follow models of convergence or divergence are invested with a 
directional sense of time. 
19
 Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson, ‘When did globalization begin?’, European Review of Economic History, 6 
(2002), 23-50. 
20
 William McNeil, A World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
21
 Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson, ‘When did globalization begin?’, 23. 
22
 Ibid, 27.  
23
 Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson, ‘When did globalization begin?’, 27. 
24
 For example, Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, ‘Path dependence, time lags and the birth of globalization: A critique 
of O’Rourke and Williamson’, European Review of Economic History, 8 (2004) 81-108. 
25
 This date was suggested in Adam McKeon, ‘Periodizing Globalization’, in History Workshop Journal, 63 (2007), 218-230, 
221.  
26
 See Jan de Vries, ‘The limits of globalization in the early modern world’, The Economic History Review, 63, 3 (2010), 
710-733. 
27
 Duncan Bell has even identified the tropes of the globalization paradigm as the defining characteristics of ‘Euro-American 
modernity’: ‘compression, acceleration, annihilation, closure: these were spatio-temporal coordinates of Euro-American 
modernity’. ‘Making and Taking Worlds’, in Global Intellectual History, 254-279, 265. 
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Thirdly they have a sense in which there is one world which is universally known, understood and 
experienced in the same way.  
There are many different genres of universal history. It is most commonly associated with the 
historiographical genre developed in Germany in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
typified by Hegel’s Philosophy of History, but the genre is broader than this. Karl Lowith 
contextualised Hegel within a longer European tradition of history from the Bible to Burckhardt, 
stopping at Orosius, Augustine, Joachim, Bossuet, Vico, Voltaire, Proudon, Comte, Cordorcet and 
Turgot, Hegel and Marx. Lowith identified all of these as reproductions of the ‘philosophy of history’, 
which he defined as ‘a systematic interpretation of universal history in accordance with a principle by 
which historical events and successions are unified and directed toward an ultimate meaning’.28 The 
globalization paradigm, which reproduces a coherent and directional narrative of the whole world, has 
much in common with this tradition of universal history broadly identified by Lowith.  
 
The globalization paradigm paradox: The return of universal history 
The globalization paradigm at work in some global histories suffers from a paradox. It is born out of 
an attempt to overcome nation-centred history on the one hand, and Eurocentric historiography on the 
other, yet it links itself closely to a meta-narrative of globalization which has much in common with 
older forms of universal history.  
The connection between global history and the return of universal history has already been 
noticed. David Christian predicted that the new historiographical turn would see the return of universal 
history, and for Christian this was not problematic; he argued that ‘the new universal history will 
contain a clear vision of humanity as a whole, for within its universal maps of the past it will be easy 
to see that all human beings share a common, and quite distinctive history’.29 Christian defined 
universal history as ‘the attempt to understand the past at all scales, up to those of cosmology, and to 
do so in ways that do justice both to the contingency and specificity of the past and also to the large 
patterns that help make sense of the details’.30 The globalization paradigm strand of global history has 
presented itself as the meta-narrative coordinating the meaning of the space and time of the world.  
Ten years earlier Walter Mignolo had warned of the continuations of universal histories, 
which he took to be a mode of the perpetuation of European colonialism. Mignolo interpreted 
globalization as the latest phase of the way in which universalist history has played a role in 
controlling the world. He wrote: ‘from the project of the Orbis Universalis Christianum [sic], through 
the standards of civilization at the turn of the twentieth century, to the current one of globalization 
(global market), global designs have been the hegemonic project for managing the planet’.31 The 
warning is clear, if national history was the handmaiden of nation states, global history can be the 
handmaiden of hegemonic claims for ordering the planet. Given the connection between history and 
power claims it is important to reflect upon the global concept at work in global history. For Mignolo, 
the paradox at work in the globalization paradigm strand of global history is one shared with the fated 
world-systems analysis which preceded it, which developed as an attempt to transcend the Eurocentric 
perspective of history but ultimately reproduced it.
32
 
                                                     
28
 Karl Lowith, Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), 1. 
29
 David Christian, “The Return of Universal History”, History and Theory, 49 (2010), 6-7-27,7. 
30
 Ibid. David Christian noted that the Encyclopedia of World History distinguishes four possible definitions of universal 
history: “a comprehensive and perhaps also unified history of the known world or universe; . . . a history that illuminates 
truths, ideals, or principles that are thought to belong to the whole world; . . . a history of the world unified by the 
workings of a single mind; and . . . a history of the world that has passed down through an unbroken line of 
transmission.” Marnie Hughes-Warrington, Berkshire Encyclopedia of World History, ed. W. H. McNeill (Great 
Barrington, MA: Berkshire Publishing Group, 2005), V, 2096. 
31
 Walter Mignolo, Local histories/global designs: coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and border thinking (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 21. Note the Latin should read Orbis Universalis Christianus. 
32
 Walter Mignolo, Local histories/global designs: coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and border thinking. Enrique Dussel 
shared this view in his ‘World-system and “trans”-modernity’ article which argued that world-system hypothesis was 
itself a narrative of the ‘rise of the west’. An example of a global history producing the ‘rise of the west narrative’ can be 
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Mignolo called for the production of ‘decolonial local histories’ to restore ‘the dignity that the 
Western idea of universal history took away from millions of people”.33 Mignolo overlooked the fact 
that pluralities of universal histories have been produced both within and outside Europe and assumed 
that all alternative histories must be produced outside Europe. Mignolo points out the need to 
relativize global concepts and see them as the product of local histories. He cites the postcolonial 
agenda of Dipesh Chakrabarty, who argued that Europe must be provincialized “so that the world may 
once again be imagined as radically heterogeneous”.34 We need to represent plural narrations of the 
world. However, Mignolo argues that critiques must come from outside Europe,
35
 and I disagree with 
this. Firstly, historiographically we should be seeking to overcome the West vs Rest binary at work in 
the discipline and not reproducing it; Europe was not the only locality to produce universalist histories 
of the world, and even in 1946 Lowith observed that the ‘occidental conception of history’, which he 
defined as ‘implying an irreversible direction toward a future goal’, ‘was not merely occidental’.36  
Secondly, the global histories produced outside Europe are not inherently theoretically alternative or 
superior. If we look, for example, at Global History: A view from the South we don’t get a radically 
alternative narrative to that produced in Europe but a Marxist perspective, which itself is a narrative 
coming from Europe and re-telling the story of capitalism. Thirdly, Pamela Crossley observed that 
“global history” is seen by some historians as an attempt to root out the last vestiges of 
“Eurocentrism”, but warned that “global history as an intellectual enterprise is a production of 
European and American historians who can never make themselves the object of study”.37 It is 
therefore important to make this shift and make space within new global histories for making 
European assumptions, epistemologies, and historiographical traditions the object of study. The 
medieval history of Europe offers the opportunity to go beyond the Fanonian postcolonial perspective 
advocated by de-colonial commentators on global history by challenging the idea that alternative 
global histories can only be found outside Europe. 
 
The globalization paradigm in the Middle Ages 
The characteristics of the globalization paradigm (the acceleration of time, the compression of time 
and space, the prevalence of spatial metaphors, a teleological narrative, and a universal claim) can also 
be found in the histories in the Middle Ages. I will present here the example of Franciscan history.  
In the thirteenth century, during the years of the leadership of John of Parma and Bonaventure 
of Bagnoregio, the Franciscans, a mendicant Order identifiable by their unique doctrine of evangelical 
poverty, developed their own eschatology of history which was based on the schema of Joachim of 
Fiore.
38
 Joachim theorised a system of concordance which he understood, Lowith summarised, as the 
‘meaningful structure of a historical process’.39 Following Joachim, Franciscan historians saw the 
world as advancing through three ages (of the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit) which were broken 
down into seven stages. Joachim located the third age of the spirit within this world and said that it 
would be ushered in by new spiritual men, viri spirituales. For Joachim the final age and end of world 
history would come about when the sixth seal of the apocalypse was broken; Joachim described the 
angel of the sixth seal as ‘the one whom Christ looks upon as His like who is to come at the beginning 
(Contd.)                                                                  
found in Ian Morris, Why the West Rules – For Now, The patterns of history and what they reveal about the future 
(London: Profile Books, 2010). 
33
 Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs, x. 
34
 Dipesh Chakrabarty (1992), 23, in Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs, 205. 
35 Mignolo, Walter, ‘The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference’, The South Atlantic Quarterly Vol. 101, no. 
1 (2002), 57–96. 
36
 Karl Lowith, Meaning in History, 54. Lowith’s interpretation of history was disputed by Hans Blumenberg, The 
Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Boston: MIT Press, 1985).  
37
 Pamela Crossley, What is Global History? (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 103. 
38
 See Joseph Ratzinger, The Theology of History according to Bonaventure (Chicago: Franciscan Press, 1971). 
39
 Karl Lowith, Meaning in History, 150. 
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of the third status of the world’s history”.40 The Franciscans were particularly receptive to the 
historical ideas of Joachim and they interpreted that St Francis was the sixth angel of the apocalypse 
and, as a consequence of their commitment to poverty, they considered themselves to be the viri 
spirituales who would usher the new age. This influenced the histories written by Franciscans since 
Bonaventure’s Major Legend of the life of St Francis, which accepted Joachim’s ideas into Franciscan 
historiography,
41
 and was particularly important to the histories of the Spiritualist Franciscans in the 
fourteenth centuries,
42
 and the universal histories written by Franciscans in the Americas in the 
sixteenth century.
43
  
In the fourteenth century the Spiritualist Franciscan Angelo of Clareno wrote a history of the 
Franciscan Order, Chronicon seu Historia septem tribulationum ordinis minorum (A Chronicle or 
History of the Seven Tribulations of the Order of Brothers Minor), in which you can find all the tropes 
that define the globalization paradigm. It was universal in the sense that it imagined a coherent 
narrative of world history which involved all people, and it was teleological as it imagined the 
unfolding of an eschatological narrative. Clareno’s history depicted the sense that the Franciscans 
were witnessing the birth of a new era of world history; he wrote ‘I have seen the enormous birth of 
the century and labor pains of the virgin before the seventh follows upon the sixth’.44 This was tied to 
the sensation that time was accelerating as the Franciscans were on the threshold of a new age of 
world history. In the fourth tribulation Angelo described John of Parma as receiving a vision warning 
of the need for change as ‘the spirit of Satan is rising up and taking action… many will fall and will 
not manage to rise again’.45  This imagery conveys a sense of urgency, linked to a sense of the 
acceleration of time. The compression of space and time was another common feature of Franciscan 
history. The figure of St Francis, founder of the Franciscan Order, represented a compression of the 
time between Christ and the Franciscans. Angelo explained how Francis’s actions were Christ’s, and 
how ‘the evangelical life renewed through Francis’.46 Angelo described how Francis received the 
stigmata on Mount La Verna, which marked him as the angel of the sixth seal.
47
 This mystical event 
symbolised the acceleration and compression of space and time which were part of the Franciscans’ 
model of history.
48
 Finally, like contemporary global histories, spatial metaphors dominated 
Franciscan histories. The prevalence of spatial metaphors in Angelo’s history demonstrated how the 
Franciscans’ commitment to poverty and pilgrimage was linked to their role in the unfolding of world 
history. Angelo repeatedly reminded the Franciscans that they are bound to be pilgrims and strangers 
(peregrine et advenae) in the world and were ‘rooted and planted’49 (plantasti eos et fundasti)50  on the 
                                                     
40
 Cited in Ubertino of Casale, The tree of the crucified life of Jesus, in Regis J. Armstrong, O.F.M. Cap., J. A. Wayne 
Hellman, O.F.M. Con., William J. Short, O.F.M. eds, Francis of Assisi: early documents, vol. II, The Prophet (New 
York: New City Press, 2001), 141-206, 149. 
41
 Bonaventure of Bagnoreggio The major legend and The minor legend, in Francis of Assisi: Early Documents, vol. II, 525-
717. 
42
 Angelo Clareno will be the example discussed below.  
43
 Gerónimo de Mendieta, Historia eclesiástica indiana, ed. Joaquin Garcia Icazbalceta (Mexico D.F.: Antigua librería, 
1870) and Fray Toribio de Benavente o Motolinía, Historia de los Indios de la Nueva España (Mexico D.F.: Chávez 
Hayhoe, 1941). 
44
 Angelo Clareno, A chronicle or history of the seven tribulations of the Order of Brothers Minor, trans D. Burr and E. 
Randolph Daniel (New York: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2005), 191. 
45
 Ibid, p. 119. 
46
 Ibid, 20 and 113. 
47
 Angelo of Clareno, Liber chronicarum, sive tribulationum ordinis minorum, P. Giovanni Boccali ed. (Assisi: Porziuncola, 
1999), 256. 
48
 Ewert Cousins describes this as ‘the mysticism of the historical event’, ‘Francis of Assisi: Christian Mysticism at the 
Crossroads’, in Steven T Kat ed., Mysticism and Religious Traditions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 163-91, 
167. 
49
 Angelo of Clareno, A chronicle or history of the seven tribulations of the Order of Brothers Minor, 32. 
50
 Angelo of Clareno, Liber chronicarum, sive tribulationum ordinis minorum, P. Giovanni Boccali ed., 172. 
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road to perfection. For Clareno, the Franciscans’ deviation from the path of perfection led to the 
tribulations which structured his depiction of Franciscan history. Clareno’s history described how the 
Franciscans’ global journey of poverty was linked to their journey through global time.  
In short, the claims of the globalization paradigm, that the world was approaching a new era, 
where the whole world was affected, time was accelerating, space was important, would have been 
familiar to the authors of Franciscan history in the fourteenth century. This may indicate that the 
globalization paradigm is linked to the broader traditions of eschatological history in ways that were 
identified by Karl Lowith, and challenges some of the assumptions about the ‘modernity’ of the 
globalization paradigm. This helps challenge the politicised periodization at work in the globalization 
paradigm.  
While the meta-narrative at work in the globalization paradigm has much in common with the 
examples of universal history identified by Lowith (which included the Bible, Augustine, and 
Joachim), and with the universal world history produced by the Franciscans’ identified here, we 
should not conclude that the globalization paradigm is the latest phase of a secularized eschatology, 
since the notion ‘secularization’ reinforces the politicized boundary between the Middle Ages and 
modernity. As Kathleen Davis has observed, there is a structural and historical link between a 
medieval/modern periodization, which has been tied to a discourse of secularization, and ‘the 
increasingly contentious, often violent function of “religion” in political life today’.51 Davis noted that 
Lowith himself, like Carl Schmitt before him, had argued that ‘secularization’ was in fact the story 
‘not of Europe’s gradual extrication from religion, but rather the sublimation of theology in the 
“world”’.52 Consequently medieval history can play an important role in rethinking global history.  
For the Franciscans, the inner meaning of the world may have been theological, but theology 
is itself historically diverse and influenced by different cultural, intellectual, and political contexts. 
The Franciscan example reminds us that there were diverse understandings of the meaning of the 
space and time of the world in the Middle Ages; by the fourteenth century they had travelled all over 
the known world and established convents in Africa, China, Russia, Scandinavia, the Middle East, and 
the Canary Islands, and they were influenced by this experience. The Order had also produced a range 
of intellectuals and historical theorists from Bonaventure to Peter Olivi, Angelo Clareno and, later, 
Gerónimo de Mendieta. The strand of Franciscan history represented here does not simply represent 
the Orbis Universalis Christianus narrative of the over-simplified European Middle Ages identified by 
Mignolo. For the Franciscans it was the spread of evangelical poverty that drove the unfolding of the 
space-time of the world, and this model of global history differed both from the unfolding of the 
history of capitalism often at work in the globalization paradigm, and the spread of a universal 
Christendom imagined by the papacy. The papacy in fact tried to repress the Franciscans’ 
interpretation of universal history on many occasions, not least in the fourteenth century when some of 
the Spiritualist Franciscans identified the pope as the anti-Christ, whose coming had been prophesized 
by Joachim of Fiore. The Roman Church had a problematic relationship with the historical writings of 
Joachim of Fiore, and the Franciscans’ use of his ideas was frequently under investigation by the 
Church. Gerard of Borgo San Donnino, who Marjorie Reeves eloquently observed ‘appropriated the 
Joachimist future for the Franciscan Order’, had his work condemned in the thirteenth century.53 When 
Angelo Clareno, a controversial Spiritualist Franciscan who himself faced imprisonment for his ideas, 
came to write his history in the fourteenth century, it was both a comment on the persecution of the 
Franciscan Order as well as a history of the world. In the Middle Ages, as in modernity, narrations of 
the meaning of the space and time of the world often responded to the politics and beliefs of the 
contexts in which they were written. The Franciscan story thus reminds us that in the Middle Ages 
there were competing meta-narratives of the world which were the products of highly politicized 
contexts. 
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The broader political context of the construction of global concepts should always be 
considered. For example, when, in the fourteenth century, the Franciscan Paolo Minorita (Paulino 
Veneto) produced histories of the world (Chronologia magna and Satyrica Historia)
54
 and a map of 
the world
55
 his construction of these global contexts was closely entangled by the desire for a new 
crusade to the Holy Lands.
56
 The narrations of space and time produced in the Middle Ages were also 
influenced by the contexts in which they developed, and this supports Davis’ opposition to the myth 
that ‘medieval people subordinated all concepts of time to the movement of salvation history’.57 
Throughout the history of the construction of representations of the space and time of the world, 
beliefs and politics have played an important role.   
 
The construction of global concepts: some lessons from the medieval mappa mundi 
Medieval history offers a way to deconstruct the objective concept of the ‘globe’ which is at the heart 
of the globalization paradigm and new global histories. Medieval history acts as a reminder that 
understandings of the world have been constructed in different ways at different times and offers 
insight into the complex influences acting upon the construction of global concepts.  
Franciscans produced histories of the world as well as intellectual theories and maps in order 
to understand and communicate the inherent meaning of the world. Like today, conceptualisations of 
the global were constructed through different mediums in the Middle Ages, through histories, 
intellectual theories (geographies and sociologies of space, cosmographies), and maps. Attempts to 
capture the meaning of space and time are linked. Histories and cosmographies were often produced in 
conjunction with maps. To cite a famous example, Martin Waldseemüller’s Universalis 
Cosmographia, which was produced in 1507 and was the first map to give the name ‘America’ to the 
New World, was made to accompany the cosmographical text Cosmographiae Introductio.
58
  
Cartographic representations of the global were concretely linked to histories and theories of the 
meaning of global space. Understanding and communicating the meaning of the world was important 
to the Franciscan Order, and so they produced maps and cosmologies as well as histories. In the 
prologue to his Satyrica Historia Paolo Minoria explained that ‘without [maps] I say it would be not 
so much difficult as impossible to imagine or conceive in the mind the dispersal of the sons of Noah 
and the four great kingdoms’.59 Paolo Minorita’s work indicates how histories, theologies, and maps 
all worked together to construct and communicate an understanding of the space of the world and its 
meaning. As we turn now, and finally, to medieval maps and cosmographies we should bear in mind 
that these are all part of the same project to unlock and represent the meaning of global space. 
Throughout the Middle Ages people produced mappa mundi, portolan charts, and 
cosmographies and histories which delineated their understanding of the world. The history of 
medieval maps also provides a glimpse of the history of the political epistemology of the European 
global concept. Examples of European medieval world maps include the Beatus maps (late eighth 
century), the Isidore world map (eleventh century), Henry of Mainz’s world map (twelfth century), the 
Zonal, Psalter, Ebstorf, and Hereford world maps (thirteenth century), and the world maps of Ranulf 
Higden, Pietro Vesconte, and Alslake (fourteenth century).
60
 These cartographical projections might 
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seem alien, and perhaps not even like representations of the world, to eyes accustomed to the 
cartographic model of the world established by Gerard Mercator in 1569. Comparisons between 
medieval maps and  with medieval mappa mundi and representations of the world that dominate 
global imaginations today can help relativize some of the assumptions at work in contemporary 
conceptualisations of the ‘global’. 
The orientation of medieval mappa mundi may at first seem different to modern world maps. 
The cartographic historian J.B. Harley observed how this can offer insight into the geo-political 
implications of conceptualisations of the global. Harley, who writes that:  
Throughout the history of cartography ideological ‘Holy Lands’ are frequently centred on 
maps. Such centricity, a kind of ‘subliminal geometry,’61 adds geopolitical force and meaning to 
representation. It is also arguable that such world maps have in turn helped to codify, to legitimate, 
and to promote the world views which are prevalent in different periods and places.
62
 
In medieval maps these “holy lands” were often Jerusalem, and in modern maps it is often the 
northern Atlantic, home of the capitalist world-system, that is centralised. In both cases the orientation 
of the representation of the world is deeply political.
63
  
Medieval mappa mundi remind us that conceptions and representations of the world are not 
neutral but are constructed to have coherent meaning and are tied to ideological positions. For 
example, mappa mundi were often constructed in such a way as to represent the flow of eschatological 
time, which gave meaning to space.
64
 Fox-Friedman described the mappa mundi as a vision “that 
attempted to unite the world’s physical reality with its deeper spiritual destiny”.65 The way in which 
representations of global space are linked to a coherent and directional narrative of unfolding time 
does not seem so alien from the globalization paradigm. 
Medieval mappa mundi also offer insights into the diverse archives that contribute to the 
construction of global concepts. If you look, for example, at the Hereford mappa mundi you find 
evidence of ideas about the space and time of the world drawn from a great range of sources: the bible, 
reports of pilgrims and travellers, medieval bestiaries, and classical cosmographies. Medieval 
representations of the world are an open framework for gaining insight into the complexity of ideas 
that contribute to the construction of a global concept.  
We also gain insight into the complexity of the construction of global concepts by looking at 
medieval cosmographies. Produced by an anonymous author at the end of the fourteenth century, the 
Libro della Immagine del mondo, held in the Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze, is a good example of a 
medieval cosmography which offers insight into the complexity of global history.
 66
 It integrates a 
story of the history of the world, charts of the planets and elements, stories of the Greek Gods 
associated with those planets, descriptions of animals, weather, and disease, and both T and O and 
portolan chart depictions of the world. Pierre d’Ailly’s Imago Mundi, published in 1410, is a more 
famous example of a medieval cosmography and shows the influence of classical scholars such as 
Aristotle and Ptolemy, the Christian scholar Isiodore of Seville, and the Islamic scholar Averroes 
among other influences.
67
 Witnessing these diverse sources that contributed to the construction of a 
                                                     
61 J.B. Harley, "Maps, Knowledge, and Power," in The Iconography of Landscape, ed. Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988: 289-90, cited in J.B. Harley, “Deconstructing the map”, Cartographica: 
The International Journal for Geographic Information and Geovisualization,  25,  2 (1989), 1-20,   6 
62 Harley, J.B. ‘Deconstructing the map’, Cartographica: The International Journal for Geographic Information and 
Geovisualization, Vol. 25, no. 2 (1989), 1-20, 6. 
63
 We only need to think about the debates over the Peters projection of the world to remember this. 
64
 See Alessandro Scafi, “Defining Mappamundi”, in D.A Harvey ed., The Hereford World Map, Medieval Maps and their 
Context (London: British Library), 2006, 345-354, 348. 
65
 Jeanne Fox-Friedman, “Vision of the world: Romanesque art of northern Italy and the Hereford mappaumndi”, in D.A 
Harvey ed., The Hereford World Map, Medieval Maps and their Context, 137-152, 147. 
66
 Libro della Immagine del mondo, anonimo, 1380, Portoani, Carte nautiche e planisfere, Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze, 
EL II.II.83. 
67
 Pierre d’Ailly, Imago Mundi (Boston: Massachusetts historical society, 1927).  
Julia McClure 
10 Max Weber Programme Working Papers 
global concept in the Middle Ages prompts a reflection on the diverse ideas shaping our own 
conception of the world.  
It is therefore additionally important to explore medieval conceptions of the world since these 
texts had a legacy in shaping later European interpretations of the world.  Christopher Columbus relied 
heavily upon Pierre d’Ailly’s Imago Mundi, and medieval descriptions of the world such as this 
shaped his imaginations and perceptions of the Americas. The impact of the medieval global 
imagination on the world today can still be found, for example, in the nomenclature of the world. The 
name ‘Brazil’, which had been the name of a mythical island floating off the coast of Ireland from the 
fourteenth century, is now firmly fixed to the land mass monopolising the South American Atlantic 
coast. In 1502 the Spanish named the Western Indian archipelago the Antilles; Antillia had often been 
cast in the Atlantic space of medieval world maps and the Antilles islands were important in the 
medieval global imagination as they had been the legendary refuge of Christians who had established 
the Sette Citades, or Land of the Seven Cities, during the Islamic conquest of the Iberian Peninsula in 
the eighth century. Patagonia is so-called because when Magellan rounded the coast of South America, 
he reported that the land was filled with giants,
68
 and thus the place came to be called Patagonia, after 
these fabled giants.  
However, medieval history is not simply an archive for ideas that have shaped modernity and 
the modern global concept. Mignolo has described the Middle Ages as an invention of modernity, but 
I argue that uncovering medieval history, and especially the diversity and complexities of its 
conceptualisations of the world, can contribute to the project of decolonising histories and 
epistemologies. Uncovering the pluralities, ambivalences, and ambiguities at the heart of the European 
Middle Ages contributes to the questioning of Europe, its histories and epistemologies, and opens up 
new directions for global history.  Medieval history is also an archive of lost ideas, possibilities and 
worlds. The Middle Ages is therefore the natural place to begin the excavation of multiple globalities, 
which should be one of the aims of a new global history that does not simply reproduce the 
globalization paradigm. Historians have looked at the global histories of early modern religious Orders 
such as the Jesuits, but these histories have too easily fitted the globalization, entangled as it is with 
the history of capitalism.
69
 Yet the Middle Ages hold more possibilities and alternative understandings 
of the world and its meaning. Medieval scholars were even more ready to accommodate the idea that 
there were multiple worlds; as Luke Clossey observes, ‘medieval philosophers had hotly debated the 
possibility of a plurality of worlds, the pluralitas mundium’ [sic].70 The idea that there may not be just 
one but many worlds coexisting came from the Greek Atomists and was kept alive throughout the 
Middle Ages.
71
 Consequently the Middle Ages have many lessons for new directions in global history.   
 
Conclusions 
This article has sought to interrogate the globalization paradigm in order to expose and discuss the 
potential paradox at work in the expanding field of global history, which risks reproducing the 
universalist conception of history that it seeks to critique. The paper has suggested that medieval 
history offers a way out of this conundrum. The paper has interpreted the globalization paradigm as a 
meta-narrative and used medieval history to show that the tropes of the meta-narrative at work in the 
globalization paradigm can be found in medieval narrations of the space and time of the world, which 
challenges the way in which the globalization paradigm can be seen as an explanatory paradigm which 
is exclusive to ‘modernity’. While it has traced similarities between the meta-narrative of the 
globalization paradigm and earlier forms of universal history it has stopped at interpreting the 
globalization paradigm as a secularized eschatology, and instead followed Davis’ line of argument 
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which does not make a distinction between ‘secular’ and ‘theological’ ideologies and instead critiques 
the idea of secularization at work in the temporal politics of periodization.   
Alternatively the article has invented the Middle Ages as a site of opportunity for excavating 
diverse conceptualisations of the world, and for gaining insight into complex processes involved in the 
construction of global concepts. It has shown how the tropes of the meta-narrative of the globalization 
paradigm were at work in the Franciscans’ narration of the meaning of the space and time of the 
world, but also noted that the Franciscans’ produced their histories in dialogue with their 
contemporary political situations, and that the histories they produced were just one form amongst 
many. Medieval history thus reminds us not just of the problems of periodization, but also of the 
complex, constructed, and political nature of global concepts, and of the historic (or cartographic) 
renderings of the coherent meaning of the space and time of the world.  
Finally, there is a need for global history as it creates a new context for exploring history 
outside of national, international, and transnational paradigms, but it should avoid the dangers 
identified here, particularly that of the return to a universal history and the reproduction of local 
politics, beliefs and ideologies. It is important to interpret the world as subject and not object as a 
starting point for any new global history and to excavate diverse understandings and representations of 
the world. In short, we must look to the past to prevent the globalization of our future.  
  
 
